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THE AIRLINES MUTUAL AID PACT:
A Lesson in Escalated Economic Warfare and
Abdicated Regulatory Responsibility
WILLIAM

G.

MAHONEY*

T

HE PENDULUM of societal opinion on any particular subject, especially if that subject has an emotional appeal, tends
to opposite extremes. In labor relations, which was but recently
denominated the master-servant relationship, society rejected the
economic exploitation of the young, the poor and the ignorant with
such firmness that a relatively few years later governmental agencies sometimes conclude that perhaps we have gone too far in the
protection of the employee, and that a particular industry may
require aid in its economic disputes with its employees. So it is with
the Airlines Mutual Aid Pact.'
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE PACT

The original Mutual Aid Pact was substantially different from
its 1976 descendant; it is doubtful it would have been approved
by the Civil Aeronautics Board or the courts if it originally had
appeared in its present form.
The history of the Mutual Aid Pact is one of continual expansion. The original agreement was approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board because it did not hinder achievement of the objectives
of Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act,' while the present one
* J.D. Notre Dame University, 1950. Formerly associated with the Department
of Justice, Mr. Mahoney is presently in private practice in Washington, D.C.
1 Stated simply, the Mutual Aid Pact is an agreement among commercial airlines whereby the signatory carriers contribute certain specified monies to a signatory carrier which is undergoing a strike of its employees.
2
Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 173, recon. denied, 30 C.A.B.

90 (1959).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
(1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
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has been approved despite the fact that (or perhaps in part even
because) it alters labor-management collective bargaining balance
in favor of management and places additional "restraints (upon
employees) consistent with collective bargaining."" In reaching
these conclusions, the Civil Aeronautics Board stepped beyond its
particular and peculiar area of expertise and statutory authority
and into a special area of labor relations in which it had little ex-

pertise and no policy responsibilities." In the most recent CAB
decision on the pact, the two dissenting members of the Board
addressed the Board's venture into the arena of labor policy administration as a regrettably partisan identification of the public
interest with an increase in management bargaining strength.'
The Mutual Aid Pact thus developed, with the approbation of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, from a defensive posture in 1958 to

an offensive posture in 1970, the year in which it was last amended.
A. The Original Mutual Aid Pact
The original Mutual Aid Pact was executed on October 30, 1958,
to be effective on October 20, 1958, between American, Capital,

Eastern, Pan American, TWA and United airlines.! It provided
'Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement, CAB Order No. 73-2-110, at 8-9 and 26
(February 27, 1973).
5Compare Outland v. C.A.B., 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960); with Mutual
Aid Pact Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 559, 609-10 (1964).
SAirlines Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 3 at 2, 8 (Minetti and Murphy,
dissenting):
[W]e regret that the Board's majority opinion here goes as far as
it does in seeming to identify the public interest with strengthening
the bargaining position of carrier management in airline labor disputes, which is the evident purpose of the Mutual Aid Agreement.
Such an air of partisanship between management and labor by a
regulatory agency is antithetical to the national labor policy, and
should be strictly avoided.
In our view, the issue is not whether the strengthening of airline
management's bargaining position which obviously results from the
1969 mutual aid amendments is a good thing per se-a judgment
which in our view the Board need not and should not make-nor
is it whether airline employees retain effective bargaining power,
which they patently do. The issue, rather, is whether under some
significant sets of circumstances the 1969 amendments may give
carrier management an incentive to act irresponsibly in prolonging
a strike.
'Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 169-70, recon. denied, 30
C.A.B. 90 (1959). The concept of such a mutual assistance agreement had been
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mutual assistance in the event the flight operations of any air carrier party were shut down by reason of (1) a strike called to enforce union demands in excess of or opposed to the recommendations of a Presidential Emergency Board appointed under Section
10 of the Railway Labor Act; or (2) a strike called before exhaustion of the procedures of the Railway Labor Act in disputes
between carriers and employees; or (3) a strike which is "otherwise
unlawful." 8 This assistance was in the form of an agreement by the
air carrier parties to pay to the strike-bound carrier the increased
revenues of the other carrier parties attributable to the strike, less
applicable added direct expenses.! These were called "windfall
payments." The Pact was for one year's duration" and was filed
with the CAB for approval under Section 412 of the Federal
Aviation Act.1 CAB approval was opposed by the unions which
represented airline employees.
In their presentation to the Board in support of the Pact, the
participating airlines argued that the Pact was necessary because
of an alleged imbalance in labor-management relations in the
industry. In their joint brief to the Board, the participating carriers
had stated:
The basic problem is one of imbalance in labor-management relations. Unions with which the airlines bargain have become so
strong and have achieved such unity of collective action that, individually, the airlines have steadily been losing the economic
capacity to deal with the unions on terms approaching equality.'
under consideration by the air transport industry since late 1956. Mutual Aid
Pact Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 559, 597 (1964).
8 Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 170, recon. denied, 30 C.A.B.
90 (1959).
'Id.
1049 U.S.C. § 1382 (1958).

"Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 170, recon. denied, 30 C.A.B.
90 (1959).
"The International Association of Machinists (now the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers); the Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (now the
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees); the Air Line Pilots Association, International; the
Air Line Agents Association, International; the Transport Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, and the Flight Engineers International Association, AFLCIO.
1 Brief for Airlines, Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 196, recon.
denied, 30 C.A.B. 90 (1959).
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The carriers went on to argue that this alleged imbalance grew out
of inter-union and intra-union cooperation and concerted action
in connection with contract negotiations and strikes. The participating carriers also argued that the payments provided for in the
original Pact were "calculated to enable a carrier to bargain more
effectively" in the face of unlawful union conduct or union demands which exceeded or conflicted with the recommendations of
a Presidential Emergency Board and would thereby deter strikes.1 '
The CAB conducted summary proceedings on the carriers' application, which did not include an evidentiary hearing, but did include briefs and oral argument and on May 20, 1959, issued
Board Order No. E-13899 approving the Pact subject to a condition, among others, that the approval would not affect the rights
and obligations of the parties or their employees under the Railway Labor Act. 5 Member Minetti, the only present member of
the Board who participated in the 1959 consideration, dissented."
In the 1959 decision the Board considered whether the Pact
violated the Railway Labor Act and concluded that it did not. The
decision was a negative one couched in the language that "we must
conclude that the unions have failed to prove their contentions
that the agreement violates the Railway Labor Act."" The decision,
however, rejected the participating carriers' contentions that the
CAB's inquiry was limited to the question of whether or not the
Pact violated the Railway Labor Act; rather the CAB considered
the question of whether the Pact threatened, by aggravation of
labor disputes, to hinder achievement of the objectives set forth
in Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act. The Board stated that
its range of inquiry in this area was limited to considering the impact of the Mutual Aid Pact upon the stability and efficiency in air
transportation that freedom from industrial strife would provide
and that matters of general policy as to labor disputes were not the
province of the Board but of the Congress.18 The CAB carefully
delineated its limited role in affecting national labor policy in its
consideration of the "public interest" aspects of the Pact:
11Id. at 4.
15Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 196, recon. denied, 30 C.A.B.
90 (1959).
10
Id.at 179.
1Id.

18

Id.

at 173.
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We next turn to the question whether the agreement threatens,
by aggravation of labor disputes, to hinder achievement of the
objectives set forth in section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act.
The public interest which we must guard, though not broadly one
of employee welfare, includes attainment of a degree of stability
and efficiency in air transportation that freedom from industrial
strife will provide.
The range of our inquiry, however, is limited to a determination
of the effect of the agreement upon these statutory objectives.
Matters of general policy as to labor disputes are not to be considered by the Board in assessing whether the agreement is adverse
to the 'public interest.' It is the function of Congress, and not to
the Board, to weigh the wisdom of such agreements as a factor in
the furtherance of labor policies not directly related to the promotion of a sound air transportation system.1'
In accord with this stated limitation of its functions in considerig the Pact, the CAB found that "we must disregard allegations
concerning the relative bargaining endurance of the parties unless
the asserted imbalance in labor-management relations pose a threat
to the development of a stable and efficient air transportation system." The Board concluded it could find no such threat: "After
examining the record, we cannot conclude that the industry has
been or, with the agreement, will be afflicted by such a disparity in
economic power as to jeopardize the attainment of the statutory
objectives."
With this conclusion, the CAB opinion in substance rejected
the carriers' principal contention regarding the problem confronting the air carriers in their labor relations: an alleged basic "imbalance in labor-management relations." Under these circumstances, the majority went ahead to approve the Pact-not on the basis
that it was in the public interest, but on the negative basis that
the unions had failed to make an "affirmative showing that the
agreement is adverse to the objectives specified by the Congress."'
In so doing, the CAB specifically disclaimed any intent to determine whether or not the Pact was wise or beneficial in the promotion of harmony between labor and management in the air trans19
Id. (footnotes omitted).
20

Id.

"Id. at 173-74 (footnotes omitted).
'Id. at 177.
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portation industry. This highly technical action of the CAB in
approving the 1959 Pact appeared quite clearly in the fully quoted
disclaimer of the majority opinion."
Member Minetti disagreed with the majority. He concluded
that the Pact violated the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and was
adverse to the public interest. Member Minetti thought that "coercion" inherent in the Pact, "will destroy the practice while retaining the procedure of collective bargaining."" His dissenting
opinion emphasized the tendency of such agreements "to make
belligerents of negotiators. '
Member Minetti also emphasized the fact that the CAB did not
have before it sufficient facts in relation to the scope of the Pact
or its effect adequately to pass judgment upon it. He also concluded
that the Pact was adverse to the public interest because it was
disruptive of labor-management relations."
2

After painstaking review of this matter, we have concluded that
the agreement must be approved. Our decision is predicated upon
the standards contained in the Federal Aviation Act, and does not
attempt to prescribe the most desirable method of adjusting labormanagement problems. Congress has not invested the Board with
the task of selecting the most salutory approach to labor-management relations; rather, Section 412(b) peremptorily commands that
"The Board . . . shall by order approve any . . . agreement . . .

that it does not find to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this Act; . . .' In performing our statutory function, we

may do no more than measure the agreement against these standards in order to ascertain whether its effect would be so detrimental
as to endanger achievement of the objectives laid down by Section
102 of the Act. Within this framework, the Board's order follows
from the lack of any affirmative showing that the agreement is
adverse to the objectives specified by the Congress. Thus our approval herein does not reflect any determination as to whether the
agreement is a wise or beneficial step in the promotion of maximum harmony between labor and management generally, or in air
transportation in particular. (Emphasis supplied.)
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14 1d. at 179 (italics omitted).
2
1Id. at 183.
21 Member Minetti was forceful in his position, Id. at 189:
From all of the foregoing, I conclude that this mutual aid agreement must be disapproved as adverse to the public interest. The
agreement strikes at the heart of the policy of the Railway Labor
Act, a statute which embodies the wisdom acquired through years
of trial and error in labor legislation. The public interest inherent
in uninterrupted air transportation is not served by permitting management to pit itself openly and adamantly against good-faith bargaining with its employees. Air transportation will continue to
progress only in an atmosphere of mutual management-labor re-
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B. The 1960 and 1962 Amendments to the Mutual Aid Pact
On October 23, 1959, the six participating air carriers requested
the Board to approve the continuation of the Mutual Aid Pact as
constituted for a further period expiring on October 20, 1960.
On March 22, 1960, before the Board had acted upon this request,
the carrier participants filed an amendment to the Pact (executed
on March 7, 1960) which broadened it to provide payments to
struck carriers in situations where the strike had been called in
the absence of a Presidential Emergency Board and despite the
fact that the struck carrier had complied with the Railway Labor
Act. Under the amendment, the Pact included all strikes, regardless of their underlying reason, and was the quid pro quo to the
enlargement of the Pact by the inclusion of National Airlines,
Braniff, Northwest, and of Continental, bringing the participating
membership to ten trunk air carriers."
The airline unions once again objected to the amended Pact and
on June 20, 1960, the CAB instituted an investigation into the
Pact. The Board's order recited that the ten participating carriers
carried approximately ninety percent of all trunk line traffic in
1959 and that the extension of the Mutual Aid Pact both in terms
of membership and scope indicated an intent to make it a long-term
feature of labor-management relations in the industry."8 Before
the hearings could be completed in the investigation which the
Board had instituted, National and Continental had withdrawn
from the Pact. National withdrew on December 31, 1961, because
of dissatisfaction over the manner and methods pursued by Eastern
in the implementation of its obligations under the Pact." On October 27, 1961, Continental gave notice of withdrawing because, in
substance, Continental thought that it would always be on the
paying and not the receiving end of the Pact."8
spect and cooperation. It will not do so by permitting air carriers,
in a private agreement, to rewrite the Railway Labor Act by silencing the employee's voice in the determination of his wages and conditions of employment.

Mutual Aid Agreement, Initial Decision of Administrative Law
Judge Arthur S. Present, CAB Docket No. 9977, at 5 (March 27, 1972).
28 Mutual Aid Pact, 31 C.A.B. 977 (1960). This is the order instituting the
investigation.
12Record at 419, Mutual Aid Pact Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 559 (1964).
30
Id. at 390-9 1.
2Airlines
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On March 26, 1962, also before the completion of the hearings
in the CAB investigation, the participating carriers filed a document with the CAB executed on March 22, 1962, which further
broadened the Mutual Aid Pact by amendment. This amendment
provided additional payments for a carrier party in the event of a
strike on the property of a carrier covered by the Pact if the socalled "windfall" payments received were less than twenty-five per
cent of the struck carrier's normal air transport operations shut
down as a result of the strike. This expanded Mutual Aid Pact was
also the quid pro quo by which the number of carrier participants
in the Pact was increased. The amended Pact became a part of
the CAB investigation.",
At these hearings, the participating air carriers advanced a
different set of reasons for CAB approval of the Mutual Aid Pact.
They now argued that the air transport unions had repeatedly misused their strike power against the airlines; that the airlines' remedies under existing laws were inadequate to protect against such
abuses; that even where there was no abuse of the strike power the
airlines were helpless to defend against "excessive and unwarranted
contract terms;" and, that the mutual aid principle was necessary
to protect the participating carriers against financial disaster.'
The airline unions continued to oppose Pact approval on the
grounds that mutual aid had hindered achievement of the objectives set forth in section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act by the
aggravation of airline disputes; that the Pact defeated the purposes
of the Railway Labor Act by increasing interruptions to interstate
commerce thereunder; that the Pact did not foster sound economic
conditions in air transportation; and that the arguments advanced
by the carriers in favor of the Pact were lacking in factual substance.'
On July 10, 1964, the Board, by a three to two vote, approved
the Pact as amended for a period of three years subject to certain conditions.' Vice Chairman Murphy concurred only to the
extent of the windfall payments provided by the Pact while Mem"Mutual Aid Pact Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 559 at 560, 576-77 (1964).
" Id. at 591-94.
"Id. at 589-91.
4
1d. at 567-68.
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ber Minetti voted to disapprove the Pact in its entirety.' Once
again, the Board's approval was 'negative" in nature, being based
upon a kind of burden of proof resting upon the unions to demonstrate that the Pact was adverse to the public interest. The Hearing Examiner" had recognized that during the period of operations
under the Mutual Aid Pact there had been a steady deterioration
of labor relations in the airline industry characterized by an increasing number of strikes and an increase in the severity and
length of such strikes; however, the Hearing Examiner found that
because of obfuscation and uncertainty produced by the crew complement controversy it could not be determined whether the Mutual
Aid Pact had acted as a causative factor in this deterioration."
The majority opinion accepted this reasoning, and concluded that
the fact of deterioration during the period of operation of the
Pact covered by the record did not raise a presumption that the
deterioration was caused by the Pact; nor did this fact alone make
out a prima facie case that the Pact violated the public interest."
During the period of operation pursuant to the Board's approval,
the CAB faced effort to extend the mutual aid principle into the
local service industry. This effort appeared in the form of a Mutual
Aid Pact between American and Mohawk which was disapproved
by a four-to-one CAB vote in Order No. E-24213, dated September
23, 1966. The Board's opinion recited that since "there is a real
prospect that Mohawk's subsidy will be increased by reason of
its participation in the agreement and we can find no offsetting
public benefits justifying such a possible increase of subsidy burden,
we conclude that the Agreement is adverse to the public interest.""
C. The 1967 Renewal Application
The CAB's 1964 aproval of the Mutual Aid Pact expired on
July 19, 1967. On December 31, 1966, Continental Airlines completed its withdrawal from the Pact, leaving only seven participating air carriers (the original members plus Braniff). On May 2,
Id. at 564.

"Hearing Examiners have since been designated Administrative Law Judges
by the Civil Service Commission.
7

" Mutual Aid Pact Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 559 at 627 (1964).
'lid. at 562-63.

"Mutual

Aid Agreement Between American Airlines and Mohawk Airlines,

45 C.A.B. 209, 210 (1966).
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1967, these carriers filed a joint application with the CAB for
permanent approval of the Pact, as amended, without further proceedings. This application was opposed by the airline unions."*
The CAB then instituted an investigation which "[would] furnish
a means for a complete reexamination of the issues previously considered by the Board in the light of such new matters as may have
developed since 1964. " '
The major thrust of the participating carriers in the 1967 application was the contention that the Mutual Aid Pact was essential
to their financial protection against strike losses. Much of the evidence involved the forty-three day 1966 strike of the airline
mechanics represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers against Eastern, Northwest, TWA,
United and National."
On March 7, 1969, Hearing Examiner Arthur S. Present issued
his Initial Decision finding that the Mutual Aid Pact was neither
adverse to the public interest nor in violation of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, and approving the Pact for an indefinite period subject to routine conditions.' The union parties
filed a petition for discretionary review, which was granted by the
Board on July 23, 1969." While this review was pending before
the CAB, the participating carriers once again broadened the scope
of the Pact by new amendments.
D. The October 31, 1969, Amendments to the Mutual Aid Pact
The new amendments were filed with the CAB, on October 31,
1969."' On December 2, 1969, the master agreement was filed;
it contained the amendments submitted to the CAB on October
31, 1969, along with certain other language. These amendments
provided:
1. The levels of supplemental payments under the Pact were in40 The

Air Line Dispatchers Association, the Air Line Pilots Association, the

Allied Pilots Association, the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, the

Flight Engineers International Association, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and the Transport Workers Union of America.
41 CAB Order No. E-26000 (November 17, 1967).
4 Airlines Mutual Aid Pact, CAB Order No. 70-7-114, Initial Decision at
18-19, 23-26 (March 7, 1969).
13 Id. at 44.

"See

CAB Order No. 70-7-114 (March 7, 1969).

' Airlines Mutual Aid Pact, CAB Order No. 70-7-114 at 1 (March 7, 1969).
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3.

4.
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creased from the twenty-five per cent of a struck carrier's normal operating expenses-as the 1962 amendments providedto fifty per cent during the first two weeks of a strike, forty-five
per cent for the third week, forty per cent for the fourth week,
and thirty-five per cent for any period thereafter;
The annual maximum liability of any one participating air
carrier for supplemental payments was increased by doubling
that liability from one-half per cent to one per cent of the carrier's air transport operating revenue for the carrier's previous
calendar year;
The conditions of entry were altered to permit any trunk carrier to join the agreement by November 15, 1969, without a
waiting period or back payment. (Under these arrangements,
National Airlines and Western Air Lines became parties to
the Pact.);
The conditions of withdrawal were modified to provide that
withdrawal might take effect at the end of any calendar year
beginning December 31, 1972, provided that one year's notice
of withdrawal was given; and
The arbitration provisions were modified to provide that disputes concerning the amount of any payment would be subject
to arbitration. Previously, only disputes over the requirement
to make 'or the right to receive payment were subject to arbitration.

The unions took the position that the CAB could not consider
and act upon the agreement then pending before it; that agreement had been significantly altered by the October 1969 amendments and there had been no evidentiary hearing on the Pact as
so amended. The unions contended that in the absence of such a
hearing CAB action would violate due process. The CAB, however, on July 27, 1970, approved the agreement as amended without hearing."' Members Murphy and Minetti dissented on the
ground that the record before the CAB was incomplete. They
stated that the case should be remanded to the Hearing Examiner
for further proceedings. "8
The unions filed a petition for reconsideration of the order and
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 16.
4
"Id., Dissenting Statement 8, Minetti and Murphy, Members.
46

47
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the CAB, upon reconsideration, determined that the Pact, as
amended, had not been the subject of an evidentiary hearing, and
therefore remanded it for such a hearing."9 Before any further procedural steps were taken, however, the carriers once again broadened the Pact by still another amendment.
E. The December 1970 Amendment to the Mutual Aid Pact for
Local Service CarrierParticipation
On December 10, 1970, the Pact was further expanded by
amendment to permit local service carrier participation. Paragraph one of the amendment provided:
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 of the agreement,
(a) any local service carrier holding a certificate of public
convenience and necessity issued by the CAB may become a party
to the Agreement by forwarding signed counterpart copies of the
Agreement and of this Amendment to each of the other parties
to the Agreement, to every other such local service carrier, and
to the CAB for filing by December 29, 1970;
(b) such adherence to the Agreement shall become effective as
of 0001 January 1, 1971;
(c) any such local service carrier not adhering to the Agreement
in the manner provided in subparagraph (a), above, may do so in
the manner described in paragraph 2(b) of the Agreement, provided that it also sign and forward to each of the other parties, to
every other local service carrier, and to the CAB a counterpart
copy of this Amendment. °
Paragraph two made the provisions of the Mutual Aid Pact fully
applicable to any local service carrier becoming a party thereto:
2. Subject of paragraph 1 (b), above, the provisions of the Agreement, including Paragraph 2, shall be fully applicable to any local
service carrier once it becomes a party to the Agreement. 1
F. The Board's Disposition of the 1969 and 1970 Amendments
Since the Pact as modified by the 1969 and 1970 amendments
is the latest version to be approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board
49

CAB Order No. 70-11-110 (November 23, 1970).
1o Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement, CAB Order No. 73-2-110, Initial Decision,
Appendix A at 10 (February 27, 1973).
91 Id. at 11. As noted above, there had been prior effort between American
and Mohawk to extend the principles of the Pact to the local service. See note
35 supra and accompanying text.
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and the first to be passed upon by the courts, it will be considered
in more detail than its predecessors.
1. The Initial Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The Pact as modified by the 1969 and 1970 amendments ultimately went to hearing before Administrative Law Judge Arthur
S. Present, the hearing officer who had approved the renewal of
the Pact in 1969. This time, however, his decision was otherwise.
While he approved the Pact as it had existed prior to the October
1969 amendments, he held invalid the amendments of October 31,
1969, December 2, 1969, and December 10, 1970, which increased the level of supplemental payments to a struck carrier from
thirty-five to fifty percent of that carrier's normal operating expenses, depending upon the length of the strike; increased a member
carrier's annual maximum liability from one-half to one per cent
of its air transport operating revenue for the previous calendar
year; and included participation by local service carriers.' The
decision of Judge Present approved the Mutual Aid Pact as not
adverse to the public interest or in violation of the Federal Aviation Act provided it was amended to eliminate the objectionable
provisions. The required amendments, it held, would be operative
from the effective date of his decision.'
Judge Present based his decision to disapprove the increased payments to struck carriers upon his conclusion that "the increased
level of mutual aid creates certain perils which may undermine the
objectives of the [Federal Aviation] Act. These risks are so serious
as to justify disapproving the increased level of payments."" He
found that a carrier could "utilize the higher level of payments as a
consideration in determining when it is opportune to settle a
strike"'5 and cited the record example of TWA which "was financially better off during the two-day strike is incurred in 1970 than
if it had fully operated on those days." The judge also noted that
Mohawk operated at a profit during a strike period with mutual aid
but at a net loss without a strike even though it received 592,000
dollars in subsidy payments during the latter period." He then con1

Initial Decision, supra note 46, at 41-43.
I5Jd.

"Id. at 25.
"Id. at 26.

"Id. at 27.
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cluded that the "higher level of mutual aid payments may sway a
carrier's decision as to when it should settle a strike, to the detriment of the public utilizing air transportation.""7
The Administrative Law Judge based his decision to disapprove
the increase in a carrier's liability from one-half to one percent
of its prior year's operating revenue on his conclusion that this
increase could impair the financial condition of certain carriers." '
He found that the one percent limitation was not the true ceiling
of carrier liability since the limitation applied only to "supplemental" and not to "windfall" payments. He cited the example of
Eastern Air Lines whose total payments exceeded the "supplemental" payments by some two hundred twenty-seven percent and
exceeded two percent of Eastern's 1969 air transport operating
revenue." Also cited was the reduction of United Air Lines'
working capital from an estimated 47,225,000 dollars to 17,520,000 dollars as of December 31, 1970, because of its mutual aid
liability as well as the payment by Pan American of 9,404,000
dollars in 1970 on the basis of a year (1969) in which its rate
of return was negative, seventy per cent of those payments being
"supplemental" payments."° The judge also noted that the record indicated "no important attention" was paid by the carriers
to the financial conditions of paying and receiving carriers in formulating the provisions of the Agreement."1 In addition, he recognized that there had been an "extraordinary shift in balance of
(mutual aid) payments toward 'supplemental' payments" since the
1969 amendments."2
The Administrative Law Judge found that of the 187,485,000
dollars paid out under the Pact from 1958 through June 1971,
forty-five percent, or 84,368,250 dollars was attributable to the
four strikes since the inception of the 1969 amendments and that
twenty-seven percent of the total mutual aid payments since 1958,
or 49,688,000 dollars were reflected in the "supplemental" payId.
56

Id. at 29-30.

,Id.at 31.
60 Id.at 30.
61 Id. at 28.
62
1d. at 30-31.
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ments made in connection with four strikes in the twenty month
period between October 1969 and June 1971.3
The hearing officer concluded that the "dangers are apparent
and outweigh the benefit that may be obtained by struck carriers
from the additional financial support afforded by the augmented
level of mutual aid."'" His decision that local service carriers should
be excluded from the Pact was based upon the conclusion that their
participation would be inconsistent with both the public interest "
as well as with the statutory scheme reflected in section 406 of the
Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. section 1376."6 This conclusion
was based on a number of findings:
1) Local service carrier members would pay struck members from
their working capital which would include subsidy receipts at a
time when shut down and ineligible for the receipt of subsidy
monies when on a "closed rate;"
2) Trunk line carriers which did not receive subsidy would also
receive subsidy monies by payments to them from local service
carrier working capital;
3) Subsidy payments are made during a strike to local service
carriers on an "open rate" and therefore mutual aid would be
unnecessary;
4) Many local service carriers were in serious financial condition
and should not be subjected to the liability of mutual aid payments;
5) If local service carriers as a group tend to gain more in money
from mutual aid than they would pay into it, then they should not
be included because "the financial results of the trunkline carriers
...indicate they can ill afford such a drain on their resources,"
e.g., in 1970, the rate of return was one and one-half percent; and
6) The record presents no "urgent need" for local service carriers
to join mutual aid or that local service carriers have been or are
"especially inviting targets for union attempts to establish industry
'
precedents. ""
On the day the Initial Decision of the Administrative Law
Judge was issued, the amendments providing for increased payments to struck carriers and increased liability of member carriers
63 Id.
4

at 30.
1d. at 32.
"Id. at 38.
"Id. at 33.
67Id. at 33-38.
6
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had been in effect for some twenty-nine months, and the local service carrier amendments had been in effect for fifteen months without CAB approval." During that period struck carriers had received and member carriers had paid out 83,585,000 dollars."'
2. The Board Decision and Order
Exceptions to the Initial Decision were filed with the CAB by
all parties. On February 27, 1973, by a three to two vote, the CAB
reversed the Initial Decision and approved the amendments as submitted," subject only to a condition that
No payment or obligation incurred pursuant to the Agreement
shall be claimed as an expense for purposes of computing the
need of such carrier for compensation payable by the Board under
Section 405 of the Federal Aviation Act; nor shall any carrier be
entitled to receive any compensation payable by the Board for
payment made or obligations incurred by that carrier pursuant to
the Agreement. 1
The Board's approval was limited to a period of five years.7"
a) The Majority Opinion
Three members of the CAB voted to approve the Mutual Aid
Pact and its amendments as submitted. They determined the primary issue to be "Whether the mutual aid payments so shift the
bargaining balance in favor of carriers as to create a serious likelihood that a carrier might resist settlement of a strike on a reasonable basis in circumstances where such a settlement was possible."7
The three-member majority concluded that the mutual aid payments could not become "a significant factor in prolonging a strike
"8The local service carrier amendments had been in effect except for a short
period between July 23, 1970, when the Board approved the October 1969 agreements without a hearing, and November 23, 1970, when the Board reversed itself after receipt of petitions by the unions for reconsideration of. its action.
id. at 1-2.
11CAB Order No. 73-2-110, Attachment 1 (February 27, 1973).
"0 Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement, CAB Order No. 73-2-110 (February 27,
1973).
71CAB Order No. 73-2-110 at 1.
72Id.
73CAB

Order No. 73-2-110 at 8. This is the type of issue which the Board
had specifically rejected as irrelevant to a consideration of the Mutual Aid Pact
in its original decision. See text at 850-52 supra.
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that otherwise was capable of settlement on a reasonable basis.""
They found that the purpose of the increased payments to struck
carriers was to increase a "carrier's willingness or ability to resist
union demands which the carrier considers to be unreasonable "
but that this purpose was not adverse to the public interest. The
majority noted that other economic pressures existed which would
prevent the carrier from being "significantly influenced" by reason
of mutual aid payments "to resist what it considered to be a reasonable settlement, or to try to force unreasonable concessions on
the part of labor."" The economic pressures referred to by the
Board were "the out-of-pocket losses occasioned within the strike
period;" the "loss of profits which would have accrued had there
been no strike;" and, the "loss of post-strike revenue" because of
passengers changing their travel patterns during a particular carrier's strike."
Although the majority referred to the conclusion by Administrative Law Judge Present that National, Northwest and Mohawk
had realized operating profits "during their strike periods, which
were attributable to the new higher level of amended mutual aid
payments, as well as TWA's decreases in losses,""8 those conclusions were rejected because they were based on strikes which occurred "primarily in 1970, an atypical year which reflected losses
by many carriers" and because they did not take into account the
"anticipated profits which (the struck carriers) otherwise would
have achieved, as well as post-strike losses."' The majority then
held that the operating profit realized by the named carriers during
their strikes because of augmented mutual aid payments "[fell]
far short of real profits" and concluded that the "losses from strikes
despite mutual aid payments remain substantial and continue to
exert tremendous economic pressure on the carrier's side of the
bargaining table.""0 The majority rejected the conclusion of the
Administrative Law Judge that the existence of the higher mutual
"Id. at 9.
7"Id. at 10.

TsId.
"7Id.at 11.
78

Id. at 12.
rId. at 13.
0
I at 14.
1d.
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aid payments created a dangerous tendency to prolong a strike.
This rejection was based upon their findings that in the National
Airlines strike the carrier had accepted a proffer of arbitration
which had been rejected by the union; in the Northwest strike the
union rejected arbitration before the company had indicated
whether or not it was seeking to arbitrate; and in the Mohawk
strike the union would not agree to arbitration only on part of the
issues as the carrier desired but would only agree to arbitrating
all of the issues in dispute.'1
The majority then found that the record was "replete with evidence of the earnest and consistent good faith efforts of National,
Northwest and Mohawk, as well as other mutual aid members
affected by strikes, to find a resolution to their strikes."" They
rejected the United States District Court findings of Northwest's
Railway Labor Act violations during the 1970 strike of its clerical
employees; the findings were categorized as "alleged Railway Labor
Act violations" which were unrelated to any issue of prolongation
of the Northwest strike. In any event, because of the "isolated instances of the nature of this alleged Railway Labor Act violation,"
the majority's conclusion that the Pact was consistent with the
public interest remained unaffected.'3
In concluding the portion of their opinion in which they held
the increased payments under the Pact to be consistent with the
public interest, the majority again stated their belief that the Pact
"would [not] contribute to the unnecessary prolongation of strikes
or otherwise upset a fair economic balance between labor and
management in any manner which would be contrary to the public
interest" because the amended Pact "does not relieve carrier management of significant economic pressure to settle a strike even
though it may enable a carrier to survive a strike without permanent financial instability."'"
The findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
that the increased liability of the carriers under the Pact would
1IId. at 14-15.
'Id. at 16.
83Id. at 16, n.15. The other major strike which occurred during this period,
that involving National, also resulted in a United States District Court ruling,
National Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 430 F.2d 957 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992. The Board did not refer to that case in
its decision.
84Id. at 17.
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be detrimental to the public interest were rejected. This conclusion
was justified by comparing, on a percentage basis, the level of
supplemental payments paid by benefitting members with the level
of benefits received by struck carriers."
The majority concluded that the Pact provided "substantial
protection from financially crippling strike losses, at a cost which
is reasonable" even though the amended Pact might result in imposing "a certain financial burden on carriers which may be
financially weak."" This burden, however, "unlike potential strike
losses, will not be a crippling one'' and would protect the carriers "most vulnerable to strike threats" from facing "a choice
between acceeding to demands creating expenses far exceeding
strike losses or incurring strike losses resulting in ruinous financial
instability."" The portion of the Administrative Law Judge's decision which would have excluded local service carriers from membership in the Mutual Aid Pact was rejected; his findings9' and
conclusions were dismissed as "arguments and contentions. 8
The majority rejected the conclusion that there was no practical
means for segregating subsidy funds from a carrier's general funds
from which mutual aid payments might be drawn. They held that
"subsidy payments normally make up a very small portion of a
carrier's overall revenues" and "so long as Mutual Aid payment
expenses are excluded from the subsidy computations, there was
no reason to conclude that the Mutual Aid payments would, in any
realistic way, be funded by subsidy payments.""0 The belief was
again emphasized that Mutual Aid provides "local service carriers
with significant protection against the financially crippling" effects
of a strike.'
The majority further rejected the conclusion that trunkline carrier payments to local service carriers are proportionately higher
than local service carriers would have to make and therefore constitute a financial drain on certain weak trunkline carriers which
,1Id. at 18-20.

" id. at 20.
" Id. at 20-21.
8

1d. at 21.
Id. at 21-24.
Io

00Id. at 22.
o1id. at 23.
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would be adverse to the public interest." It was concluded that the
Pact provided reasonable assurance that the financial drain would
be borne by those carriers which, on the basis of total revenues,
"are in the best position to incur it" and, in any event,
it did not appear unreasonable . . . for the trunkline carriers to
seek, and pay a price for, some protection against the possibility
that a local service carrier, solely by reason of its relatively weak
condition, might succumb to employee demands which otherwise
would be unacceptable and which could then be demanded of the
trunkline carriers as a new industry norm.93
The opinion concluded with a consideration of "the Mutual Aid
Agreement as a whole."" In this discussion the majority referred
to a strike by employees of a carrier as "undue economic pressure;"
and expressed tacit belief that absent the amendments to the
Mutual Aid Pact, the employees of carriers could compel their employers to accept all their requests." The majority again emphasized
belief in air carriers' peculiar vulnerability to strike threats and
concluded that "additional restraints" which could be imposed
upon labor by management with the approval of the CAB were
"not contrary to the public interest."'
b) The Dissent
The dissenting members of the CAB disapproved both the increased "supplemental" payments to a struck carrier and the increased liability of member carriers as contained in the October
1969 amendments. They also stated they would "remand for further hearing the issue of whether an additional condition should
be imposed precluding payment of benefits, under the Agreement
to a struck carrier which has violated the Railway Labor Act subsequent to the commencement of a strike." Finally, the dissenting
members concluded they would approve the inclusion of the local
service carriers in the Mutual Aid Pact as provided by the December 1970 amendments if their inclusion was made subject to the
condition imposed by the majority."'
9I ld. at 24.

"Id. at 24.
4
1d.
I at 25.
ld. at 25-26.
9"Id. at 26.
'1ld. Dissenting and Concurring Opinion at 1.
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At the outset of their opinion the dissenting members criticized
what they perceived to be the partisan character of the majority's
opinion. The majority had stated the issue in the case to be "whether
mutual aid payments so shift the bargaining balance in favor of
carriers as to create a serious likelihood that a carrier might resist settlement of a strike on a reasonable basis in circumstances
where such a settlement was possible."98 The type of criticism
leveled at the majority's opinion is seldom found in federal agency
opinions. The dissenting members strenuously disapproved of what,
in their view, was the majority's injection of itself into the bargaining structure of the industry. They criticized the majority for
identifying the public interest with a strengthening of air carrier

bargaining power thereby effectively becoming "a partisan on the
side of management against labor.""9 The dissent rejected the issue
as phrased by the majority:
"Supra note 69, at 8.
"
[W]e regret that the Board's majority opinion here goes as far as
it does in seeming to identify the public interest with strengthening
the bargaining position of carrier management in airline labor disputes, which is the evident purpose of the Mutual Aid Agreement.
Such an air of partisanship between management and labor by a
regulatory agency is antithetical to the national labor policy, and
should be strictly avoided.
The Board's dilemma, of course, is a real one: under most circumstances, in view of its promotional role toward the air transportation industry and its regulatory responsibilities toward the traveling
public, the Board is bound to regard whatever lowers airline costs
as good, and whatever increases those costs as bad. Nevertheless,
the Board cannot take that attitude toward airline wages without
becoming a partisan on the side of management against labor. We
do not suggest that the Board majority has here in any way deliberately set out to align itself with one side or the other of airline
labor disputes. Nonetheless, it is difficult to read the majority opinas a whole, with its recurrent emphasis on the 'stability' assertedly
afforded by the Mutual Aid Agreement and on the 'reasonableness'
of management positions (with no explicit recognition that union
positions may be equally reasonable from the standpoint of the
workers' interests), without deriving a distinct impression that the
majority believes that strengthening management's bargaining power
in wage disputes is an affirmatively beneficial thing.
However difficult it is for the Board to preserve a stance of total
neutrality in labor-management conflicts, once the parties have
fulfilled their statutory obligations under the Railway Labor Act,
we believe the Board must bend every effort to do so. To that end,
we would rigorously avoid making any judgments as to the reasonableness of either management or union positions and actions,
either in general or in relation to particular disputes. We would
recognize that 'reasonableness' in labor disputes is a term with no
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In our view, the issue is not whether the strengthening of airline
management's bargaining position which obviously results from the
1969 mutual aid amendments is a good thing per se-a judgment
which in our view the Board need not and should not make-nor
is it whether airline employees retain effective bargaining power,
which they patently do. The issue, rather, is whether under some
significant sets of circumstances the 1969 amendments may give
carrier management an incentive to act irresponsibly in prolonging
a strike."
On the issue of the increased "supplemental" payments under
the October 1969 amendments to the Pact, the dissent agreed with
the conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge "who heard the
testimony of the witnesses" that such increased payments created
a "distinct danger" that interruptions to airline service would be
"prolonged by the level of payments available under the amended
Agreement."'' The dissenting members noted that the amendments
were designed to provide payments which would exceed a struck
carrier's running expenses; consequently, it was now typical for a
struck carrier to show a profit during a strike.' The dissent noted
that the majority admission that the increased "supplemental" payments were "bound to influence carrier managements in the direction of holding out against union demands," but-according to
the majority-such resistance would be maintained only against
"unreasonable" demands. The dissent noted that "one man's unreasonable demand is another's reasonable request." The dissent
rejected the majority's conclusion that air carrier managements
would resist only "unreasonable" demands as a finding that was
"both futile and contrary to the CAB's proper role as a neutral in
labor conflicts." '
The dissent also rejected the majority's conclusion that airline
wages have increased unduly because of the air carriers' "peculiar
vulnerability to strikes." There was no evidence to support a finding that the air carrier industry was any more vulnerable to strikes
fixed or generally agreed meaning, and one which inevitably takes
on quite different connotations on opposite sides of the bargaining
table. Supra, note 93 at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
"o

Supra note 69, at 8-9.

Supra note 93, at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
"0s Id. at 6, n.5.

"

"'1
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than other service industries or perishable goods industries; further, national labor policy does not require that all industries be
placed upon the same bargaining footing as hard-goods manufacturing industries.1 ' Numerous other factors were also listed which
the dissenters believed had been ignored by the majority and which
could have accounted for increases in wages in the airline industry. "
The majority had refused to recognize the profits provided by
the October 1969 amendments to a carrier during a strike because
they considered them to fall "far short of real profits."'" In order
to support that conclusion, the majority had held that because of
a strike a carrier would lose its projected "normal" profits and
would incur "post-strike losses." The dissenting members rejected
this view of the profits realized by a struck carrier under the October 1969 amendments. They concluded that "the critical point is
that under the 1969 amendments a struck carrier's mutual aid payments can be so generous that it can show an operating profit
while its operations are shut down by a strike. 1 °. This was a
"fundamentally unhealthy situation, conducive to results adverse
to the public interest, much as would be an insurance scheme which
resulted in the insured collecting more than the value of his loss."1 '
Since the evidence demonstrated that several of the carriers who
had been struck since the October 1969 amendments had been
operative had no profits to lose, and that strikes often occurred
during the "off-season" when carriers normally expected to operate
without profits,10' the "normal" profit loss relied upon by the majority was thought to be immaterial.
The majority's reliance upon "post-strike losses" was challenged
since, in the opinion of the dissenting members, the record did not
support a conclusion that "prospective post-strike losses increase
in any simple way in direct proportion to the length of the strike. 110
The dissenters found that probably most prospective post-strike
10

Id. at 7.

'0' Id. at 7, n.6.
"' Supra note 69, at 14.
' 0 7 Supra note 93, at 8 (footnote omitted).

101 Id. at 8.
10I Id. at 8-9.
11OId. at 10 (footnote omitted).
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losses accrue immediately upon commencement of a strike and
would not be greatly increased by a delay in settlement.1 and, in
any event, because the "incidence and measurement [of poststrike losses] is a matter of great complexity and involves a considerable degree of speculation."' The dissent concluded that it
was "surely significant that the participating carriers have never
been able to agree among themselves on a valid measure of poststrike losses, so as to permit their direct compensation under the
Mutual Aid Agreement. 11.
Regarding the majority's dismissal of member carriers' increased
financial liability under the Pact, the dissenting members of the
CAB agreed with the Administrative Law Judge. The Judge had
pointed out that the Pact's provision for supplemental payments,
took no account of the current financial condition of the paying
carriers and that the bulk of Mutual Aid payments since the 1969
amendments "took effect have been to otherwise highly profitable
carriers from carriers who were currently either losing money or
earning less than a reasonable return on investment.""" The dissent
then quoted the amounts assessed against Pan American under
Mutual Aid, noting that they exceeded the amount which the CAB
found would have been diverted from Pan American by virtue of
the acquisition of Caribair Airlines by Eastern Airlines; the CAB
had held that this diversion "showed so great a danger to (Pan
American's) financial integrity as to require disapproval" of that
acquisition."' The dissenting members concluded that "the price
to those participating carriers already in financial difficulties is too
high to be in the public interest.""..
The dissenters concluded that the majority had not adequately
dealt with violations of the Railway Labor Act by carrier members
occurring during strikes. The majority had ignored evidence that
the strike involving Northwest had been prolonged because that
carrier had insisted "on including in the back-to-work agreement
provisions which the unions contended would require them to ratify
Id. at 10.
at 9.

'I'

1'Id.
'l3

4

Id.

ld. at 11.
"'Id.at 12, n.l1.
"1d. at 12.
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the carrier's Labor Act violations."' ... The dissent believed it was
"essential that mutual aid not be payable where a strike has resulted
from a carrier's violation of the Railway Labor Act.""' The majority's "attempt to dispose of the Northwest-BRAC incident in a
footnote" was criticized."' The dissent as "entirely unsatisfactory,"
and the "attempt to shrug off the violation even if it did prolong
the strike"'' 0 was characterized as "wholly arbitrary." As noted
above, the dissenting members concluded that the issue of the
effect of Railway Labor Act violations upon the duration of the
strike should be remanded for further hearing.
G. Court Review
Separate petitions for review of the CAB's approval of the Pact
were filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit by the Air Line Pilots Association, International and six other unions' jointly. On August 8, 1974, the
Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming the CAB."
The court relied on the CAB's finding that the "record is replete with evidence of the earnest and consistent good faith efforts
of [the Mutual Aid Pact Members] to find a resolution to their
strikes throughout the course of difficult labor negotiations" and
held that the "Board's approval of the Pact, as amended, [was]
fully consistent with the national labor policy and the RLA [Railway Labor Act]..'
The court held that it could not upset the CAB order unless it
were unsupported by substantial evidence or unless its judgments
"[flall outside a zone of reasonableness."" The CAB's lack of
11"
Id. at 13.
"I

Id.

"'Id. at 14, n.16.
120 Id.
121 The six other unions were the Air Line Dispatchers' Association, the
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, the Communication Workers of America, the Flight
Engineers' International Association, the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, and the Transport Workers Union of America.
22Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975).
11Id. at 456-57, citing Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
"24 Id. at 457.
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expertise in labor matters was considered immaterial in light of
its undisputed finding that "the employees retain substantial and
effective bargaining power regardless of the Mutual Aid Agreem ent.

,,

25

The unions' claim of the tendency of the amended Pact to prolong strikes was rejected on the basis of the CAB findings that
negotiations have seldom "erupted into strikes in recent years" and
"significant pressures to settle remain on the airlines despite their
1
participation in the Pact." "6
With regard to the evidence demonstrating the Pact's provision
for a struck airline to receive a financial profit during a strike, the
court concluded that the CAB "reasonably believed" those profits
should be compared with "normal profits" for a similar period and
should include calculations of "post-strike losses.""" The court
lamented the fact that the Board had not "addressed itself to the
methodological problem inherent in estimating" the loss factors.
The CAB had accepted the companies' figures, but held that the
unions had not cited evidence to show the companies had "reached
their estimates by misguided or meritricious methods." In any
event, the court noted that since the CAB approved the Pact for
only five years, "if the CAB's 'hypothecations' prove wrong, they
2
may be corrected."'
Regarding the effects of the Pact upon the financial stability
of its members, the court held the "Board concluded, not unreasonably, that the payments are not out of proportion to the protection offered."" Finally, the court concluded that the CAB
findings were adequately supported, the result reached was a reasonable one and "the claim of bias on the part of CAB .... [was]
without substantial foundation."'' . The United States Supreme
Court denied the unions' petition for certiorari."
l Id. at 458, quoting CAB Order No. 73-2-110 at 8.
I" Id. at 459.

Id.
128
Id.
127

' Id. at 560.
1"0Id. at 460 n.33.

"'1Allied Pilots Ass'n v. CAB; Air Line Dispatchers' Ass'n v. CAB; Air Line
Pilots Ass'n v. CAB, 420 U.S. 972 (1975).
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II.

THE PROBLEM PRESENTED

The Mutual Aid Pact seems to have established itself, however
tenuously, before the CAB, and the CAB's views would seem, for
the time being at least, to have received judicial sanction. Given
the tone of the courts' opinion and the quality of the CAB's dissenting opinion, it seems likely that the court would have upheld
CAB approval of the Pact had one Board Member shifted his vote.
Although the CAB and the courts may have disposed of the issue
of the legal validity of the Pact, it is quite clear that the problems
attendant upon the existence of the Pact have not been resolved
with the issuance of the decisions of those tribunals.
In the course of his testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
the witness for the labor organizations noted that the Mutual Aid
Pact was unique among cooperative ventures by management or
labor in this country; it prolonged interruptions to carrier service
caused by strikes; it had produced no beneficial effects for the
public or the industry; and, most significantly, it might well force
the employees of the industry to counter in kind resulting in the
catastrophe of "open economic warfare" in the air transport industry. The labor organizations' witness concluded that such a
result could be avoided only by enactment of a law outlawing the
Mutual Aid Pact. '
" Hearings on H.R. 1234 Before the House Comm. of Public Works and
Transportation, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) at 19, 24-25 [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 1234]:
The Mutual Aid Pact cannot be compared with any labor cooperative venture by any group of managements or labor organizations in any other industry. The railroad industry strike insurance
plan is not comparable. That plan can only be used in the event
of an illegal strike and then its benefits provide a bare subsistence
level to the struck carrier.
In any event, it has not had an effect either upon collective bargaining relationships in the railroad industry or upon our national
rail transportation policy.
The airlines' Mutual Aid Pact, however, prolongs interruptions to
service because of its profit provisions; drains certain carriers who
can ill afford it of much needed capital; and, encourages violations
of the law. By removing the struck carrier's incentive to settle while
the sufferings of striking and non-striking employees intensify, the
Mutual Aid Pact seriously unbalances the equality of the parties
at the airline collective bargaining table. On the other hand, the
Pact has produced absolutely no beneficial effects for the public or
the industry.
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The conclusions of the labor organizations' 1975 testimony before the Congress fully confirm the statements of Board Member
Minetti made some eleven years earlier in his dissent to the 1964
Mutual Aid Pact Investigation decision. In that dissent Member
Minetti delineated the basic problem with the Pact: it creates,
intentionally or not, "a picture of union irresponsibility" and what,
understandably, could and has been received by labor as union

hostility "to which the unions have responded with matching mistrust. ' " It seems painfully obvious that action must be taken to
resolve this deplorable and dangerous situation.
If the situation worsens, as it most surely will worsen as the Pact
is continuously amended, expanded and approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, the employees of the industry will be forced to
develop methods of protecting themselves.
Throughout the testimony of the air carrier witnesses who have appeared before the Board in proceedings related to the balance of
collective bargaining strength in the industry such as the Mutual
Aid Pact proceedings and the proceedings involving the establishment of a single bargaining agent for the industry called the Airline
Industrial Relations Conference there was repeated reference to the
carriers need to develop 'arsenals of weapons' to be used against the
unions, as if collective bargaining was a kind of internicine warfare in which each side was out to beat the other to its knees.
In our view, that has never been the object of the labor unions who
are represented here today. We hope it never will be. But, if the
employees are forced to defeat the Mutual Aid Pact in open economic warfare, as they will if driven to it, everyone will suffer, including those airlines who never have strikes but who pay, and pay,
and pay, under the provisions of the Pact.
Those who will suffer most, however, will be the employees and
the public through loss of work, loss of service, and a more deeply
depressed economy.
We have not as yet reached that critical stage but we are most
assuredly approaching it. No union official wants such a catastrophe to occur. No responsible carrier official should desire it either,
but shortsightedness has been the cause of many unwanted and unplanned tragedies.
H.R. 1234 and H.R. 1320 are the only hope we now have of avoiding economic warfare in this industry; of preventing CAB sanctioned violations of law; of preventing prolonged interruptions to
air commerce; and, of eliminating unnecessary and extreme drains
on the capital resources of those carriers which maintain good labor
relations.
We respectfully urge as imperative, the swift enactment of H.R.
1234 and H.R. 1320.
""'Mutual Aid Pact Investigation, 40 CAB 559, 566 (1964):
This record establishes beyond doubt that the unions from the outset have viewed the Pact as a direct attack on their bargaining integrity, and that this belief has been reenforced by the step-bystep process of amendment to broaden and extend the agreement
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In the 1964 case, the majority opinion noted, "as an alternative
to approval of the Pact the unions propose that 'the gap between
negotiations, during which misunderstandings arise, which makes
ultimate settlement of differences difficult if not impossible, be

occupied with joint management-labor conferences.' "" Such labormanagement conferences have been an integral element of labor
relations in the railroad industry for a decade. They have proved
their worth repeatedly by fostering good labor-management rela-

tions and in solving many issues which otherwise could well have
escalated into serious labor-management confrontations. Unfortunately, labor-management conferences of the type suggested by
the unions in 1964 and used in the railroad industry since that
time, have not been utilized in the air transport industry.
There is little doubt that the nation is faced with a continuing

escalation in labor-management hostility in the air transport in-

134

both as to membership and coverage. It is not of critical importance
whether the Pact was or was not so intended. The important thing
is that the unions, not without some justification under the circumstances of the agreement's conception and expansion, have so
viewed it.
Certainly no one could justifiably contend that all of the labor unrest that has occurred should be laid at the door of the Pact. Even
less could it be contended that sole responsibility for the conditions that have come about should rest on management or labor.
The important thing is that the Pact has created and nurtured a
spirit of distrust that is destructive of the mutual confidence and
respect which is essential to the successful negotiation and solution
of problems in the emotionally charged atmosphere of labor-management relations.
The majority has accepted the examiner's finding that the evidence
does not demonstrate a causative connection between the deteriorating labor-management relations and the Pact, or substantiate
the predictions that the Pact will cause future labor unrest. To me,
this is no answer to the problem before us.
I do not believe that this Board in fulfilling its responsibilities can
close its eyes to known and critical facts. The Pact, intentionally
or not, has from the outset created a picture of union irresponsibility and what, understandably, could and has been viewed by
labor as union hostility. The unions have responded with matching distrust. The attitudes of labor and management toward each
other have hardened. And so there have evolved reciprocal manifestations of lack of confidence and trust which, even with goodfaith bargaining on both sides, are destructive of that atmosphere
which must prevail if the industry is to avoid the industrial strife
that poses a direct threat to the development of a stable and efficient air transportation system.
d.at 563.
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dustry"= which the Civil Aeronautics Board seems to believe either
does not exist or can be controlled at some future time by CAB, or
perhaps by Congressional action. The public should not be required to sit by and await an explosion in the air transport industry which would require emergency legislation. The CAB, regardless of its views as to the right or wrong of the Pact, should have
recognized the explosive character of the situation and set about
to defuse it. Instead, it did nothing. The Court of Appeals, recognizing the CAB's restricted ancillary authority in labor relations,
accepted the latter's finding that the Pact caused no particular
labor-management problem. There seems to be little left for those
who would eliminate the negative effects of the Mutual Aid Pact
except appeal to the Congress.
Ill. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE ELIMINATION OF THE PACT
Congressmen receive many constituent complaints during the
course of a long strike, particularly where the struck airline is able
to operate only a portion of its routes and can choose to operate
"those on which its competitors were not participants in the Mutual
Aid Agreement over those on which they were, and those on which
it had competition over those on which it did not.' 3 With the
demise of the railroads as a major carrier of intercity passengers,
hundreds of American communities became dependent upon the
airlines for long distance intercity passenger transportation. A
prolonged interruption of that service can seriously affect the economy of these communities. When interruptions occur, the communities and their citizens make their views known to their representatives in the Congress.
For several years a number of bills which would outlaw the
Mutual Aid Pact have been introduced in both Houses of Congress.
Prior to 1975 these legislative proposals were not processed to
hearing, perhaps because the Mutual Aid Pact was under consideration by the CAB and the courts, or perhaps because the pressures for the enactment of such legislation tend to wane with strike
settlements. In the most recent session of Congress, however, bills
"3 In this connection, see Unterberger and Koziara, Airline Strike Insurance:
A Study In Escalation, 29 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REV. 26 (1975).
13
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prohibiting the Pact were introduced in both Houses of Congress...
and processed through hearings before the appropriate subcommittees of the House and Senate. 3 Since these bills were not finally
acted upon by the close of the 94th Congress, they probably will
be re-introduced during the first session of the 95th Congress.
IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The industry's continued utilization of the Mutual Aid Pact is
somewhat mystifying. Throughout all of the testimony and arguments presented to the CAB, the courts and the Congress over the
past eighteen years of the Pact's existence, the air transport industry has never claimed that the Pact has accomplished any of its
publicly stated purposes. There is no evidence that the union demands have been less or the settlements less because of the Pact;
further, there is no evidence that the unions' bargaining power has
been weakened, or that the number of strike days has been reduced.1"'
On the other hand, the cost of the Pact to some airlines has
been almost disastrous. Eastern, who could ill afford it, paid to its
chief competitor, National, some thirty-seven million dollars between January 1971 and December 1975.'" Eastern has recently
indicated it would like to be free of the Pact. Pan American withdrew its membership as of December 31, 1975.
Perhaps the members of the Pact believe that their labor costs
would increase substantially without the Pact; or, while they may
realize the Pact has not improved their situation, they may feel
that it has at least prevented that situation from getting any worse.
Whatever the reasons for the industry's adherence to the Pact, it
seems obvious that the labor relations atmosphere in the air transport industry will not improve so long as the Pact exists; unfortu-

1'7 The Senate bill, S. 306, was introduced by Senator Gravel of Alaska with
ten cosponsors and in the House of Representatives H.R. 1234 and related bills
had some 75 co-sponsors.
188Hearings on H.R. 1234; HEARINGS ON S. 306 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM.
ON COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
" While strikes have been somewhat fewer, at least in the past five years,
their length has increased substantially. Indeed, between January 1, 1970, and
December 1975, National and Northwest Airlines had been on strike 25% of
the time. Hearings on H.R. 1234 at 22.
140 Id.
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nately, it also seems obvious that the industry will keep the Pact
in existence so long as labor relations remain in its deteriorated
state. The resolution of this dilemma must be accomplished from
outside the industry. The only non-industry agency now remaining
which can accomplish that result is the Congress.
The Congress should amend the Railway Labor Act with a provision establishing a joint conference commission comprised of
representatives of air carrier management and labor to deal with
the labor relations problems arising between labor-management
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. It should provide
this commission with a life of at least four years. The commission
should be required to report back to the Congress after three years
with recommendations, if any, for further legislative action. This
type of conference committees has proved successful in the railroad
industry; it should be given the opportunity to work in the air
transport industry.
In order to permit the commission a chance of success, the major
cause of labor-management hostility in the industry-the Mutual
Aid Pact-would have to be eliminated. If the Congress were
thereby to require both labor and management to start afresh, in an
atmosphere of mutual self-interest, the industry, the employees
and, most of all, the nation would be the beneficiaries.
A voluntary undertaking by management and labor to accomplish such an end would be far preferable to a solution initially
imposed by law; however, a voluntary undertaking appears impossible and a responsible government cannot watch impassively
as labor relations worsen and hostility rises in a vital industry.
Action must be taken to resolve this problem; if the parties themselves, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the courts are unwilling,
then the task must be accomplished by Congress.
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